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"Court's current position on Blackstone's prior restraint dictum" as
being "well expressed" in Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Times
Filmy'
Finally, it must be pointed out that the author's more or less in-
discriminate excerpting from majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions is confusing, misleading and does not present anything ap-
proaching an accurate protrayal of the law. An obvious example of
this is found at page 226 where, under a paragraph headed Any Film
Censorship is Called Unconstitutional, this proposition is supported
solely by the Black-Douglas concurring opinion in Superior Films v.
Ohio.28
The basic defect of the book is that the author does not "tell it like
it is," but rather as he would like it to be. It is doubtful that lawyers or




A PuE TrEoRtY oF LAw. By Hans Kelsen. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1967. Pp. 356. $7.50.
In normal expression the term law tends to carry a deceptively
familiar meaning; the term jurisprudence a somewhat forbidding con-
notation of exploration of the philosophical deep. By most standard
measures, the contrast holds. Yet not only does the juridical underlie
the legal order, but riddles its every aspect. A profound simplicity
irradiates from the child's reaction of "why" to a command, a simple
query ever relevant to all aspects of the legal imperative. Consequently
law as a field requires refinement, not so much to glean the dross of
reality as to allow intelligible perception of its supple internal system
of validification. This immensely difficult task, itself an exercise in the
highest orders of jurisprudence, Dr. Hans Kelsen endeavors to under-
take in A Pure Theory of Law.'
His work does not pretend to be some metaphysical thunder out
of Sinai, nor any interpretive social scientific prism refracting the legal
order as reactive adjustments to cultural context, nor indeed any kind
of revealed gospel dispensed from profound preconceptions of prin-
27Id. at 42.
28 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
'H. Kx,.sEN, A Put Tronry ov LAw (1967).
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ciple. He seeks range, not omniscience. Endeavoring to stress law as a
science, Kelsen works with Teutonic thoroughness and meticulously
close, if not confusingly subtle, reasoning to give the normative values
of law a cohesive and coherent architechtonic structuralization. If only
because of his concentration of effort, let alone because it is the life-
time reflections of one of the western world's leading jurists, this work
contributes substantially to both the physiology and the anatomy of
jurisprudence.
Kelsen perceives both a theory and a condition. In his view, failure
to realize the need for theory crucially debases the science of law
per se, for "uncritically ... law has been mixed with the element of
psychology, sociology, ethics, and political theory."2 Theory aside
though, the condition tempers the core. Human norms can at best
constitute relative values, but both law and the state nevertheless find
their key phyla of distinction in the concept of coercive obligation. This
cognates them, and without it they would, after the Marxian manner,
wither away. Flux and social justice notwithstanding, the law therefore
assumes a functional infallibility, in effect, the process commissioned
to stop the buck of Truman era renown.
Upon these assumptions, Dr. Kelsen weaves with interstitial per-
ception the resultant relationship of the law into its paramount col-
league fields of reference. He does not exhaust every possible subject,
but avoids no major relevancies.
With regard to nature, the author conducts a careful series of dif-
ferentiations. The law must be cast in terms of norms, an "ought" that
is nevertheless directed toward an "is" of reality which must possess
minimum effectiveness to be at all valid. Hence the law must be
centered about human realities, constantly keeping in mind the two
different spheres of value and reality, and relying on validity rather
than truth for measurement. To be sure man may incline to perceive
matters anthropocentrically, replete with transcendental and socially
immanent sanctions, but these like the facts of operative existence re-
main essentially contextual, since universally all objects of law turn
out in the final analysis to be "orders of human behavior." Vortexed
around the functioning community as both a berth of reality and a
source of legitimation, the legal order requires a monopoly of coercion
under its paramount charge of achieving a collective security essential
to social peace. But while this peace may be an essential function it is
not the summum bonum, for Kelsen deeply stresses that communal
pacification is not the "moral minimum" common to all law. Its mis-




The reaching, though, shuns pretention. In relation to morals the
Pure Theory of Law (and this review hereinafter follows the author's
capitalization) rejects traditional notions of jurisprudence and posits
one criterion-beware of absolutes. Law and morals constitute different
universes of a normative system, a living dichotomy demanding per-
petual differentiation. Moreover moral values and indeed moral systems
the Pure Theory denominates as relative, thus obviating some kind of
ubiquitous, intrinsic ethic against which law must always be assessed.
In this interpretation justice as well as values becomes relativistic, and
hence renders the immemorial issue of an unjust law essentially
immaterial. The thesis is methodological, the result substantive, for
•.. the task of the science of law is not to approve or disapprove its sub-
ject, but to know and describe it . . . not the evaluation of its subject
but its value-free description.8
Law must also be clearly demarcated from natural science. The
latter moves largely on the principle of causality, the former together
with social science upon the idea of imputation. Analagous to cause,
this connective concept stands apart through involvement with human
cognition. The apposition finds reinforcement in primitive human
thought patterns, which essentially personalized the outer world and
could not begin to comprehend the dualism of nature and society.
Still, the role of this cognition assumes no sovereignty. The Pure
Theory rejects the "mingling of law and the science of law" charac-
teristic of the realistic school of jurisprudence, and will not trans-
valuate. The social scientist is not a social authority, legal theory only
describes while legal norms prescribe, and as a whole the law may
command but it cannot teach.
Concordantly, Dr. Kelsen vigorously objects to any idea of the
law as ideology, with its concomitant theoretical implication of theory
as legal sociology. The Pure Theory seeks to define and clarify, to
validate rather than evaluate. Here then the approach receives its
philosophical classification and hence its name, that of radically re-
alistic legal positivism. Political type assessments are repudiated, in
that
[p]recisely this anti-ideological tendency shows the Pure Theory of Law
is a true science of law. Ideology . .. veils reality either by glorifying it
with the intent to conserve and defend it, or by misrepresenting it with
the intent to attack, to destroy, and to replace it by another.... Such
ideology is rooted in Wishing, not Knowing .... 4
3Id. at 68.
4 Id. at 106,
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In a way such an attribution of impartial maestoso reaches to the
heart of the concept of the rule of law, an attribution to which some
contemporary American juristic trends might do well to harken.
The corpus of the Pure Theory, replete with intermeshing into the
whole panoply of regular problems and concerns of the legal order,
emerges in its bifurcated treatment of the static and dynamic aspects
of the law. The first deals with the law as a system of valid norms-
the law at rest-while the second deals with the process by which the
law is created and applied-the law in motion. Legality encompasses
the whole, for the law is unique in that it regulates its own creation
and movement, a transcription of the ancient yet adept adage of the
law as a seamless web.
In legal statics, the analysis proceeds with well marshalled albeit
somewhat convoluted vigor. The element of delict acts as a constant
condition of the law, but again must always be considered relatively-
transgressions are always mala prohibita, never mala in se. Sanctions
form the essence, and legal meaning can only be expressed in terms of
human behavior. As an outgrowth obligation controls, and human rights
must mainly be understood as reflexive correlative applications of duty.
Rights are not to be derogated, but neither are they to be given a
natural law type of premium priority that would permanently compro-
mise the legal order. Political rights stand in a special category, in
that they allow an influence in the formation of the will of the state,
but only one principle stands immutable, the "lawfullness of the ap-
plication of the law, immanent in all law."
More particularly, this casts a different complexion on the legal
spectrum of the concept "person." Authority should not be personified
as some kind of fictional self, although deference should be rendered
to the office and not the man designated to its exercise. The content of
legal norms is not individuals, but their behavior, a theorem allowing
for recognition of superordinate and subordination yet withal
erasing traditional distinctions between private and public legal re-
lations. So also juristic persons-whether human, corporations, or even
a controlling community-are not separate but sectile entities, blend-
ed by the ether engraftments of legal science into one system dis-
tinguished by their scope rather than any subjective particularism. By
this approach in Kelsen's analysis, the Pure Theory qualifies as uni-
versal, totalistic, and objectively valid, a "truly organic" theory treat-
ing law as an order and all legal problems as order problems.
If validity then becomes so vital, so also must the issue arise of
what makes law valid, and the answer involves the dynamic aspect of
19681
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law. This means process, the presupposition of a last and highest
legitimizing norm. This approach eschews norm content, and certainly
the axiom of a "directly evident" postulate emanating from reason and
imparting a substantive, deductible hierarchy of interrelated value judg-
ments. Instead it looks to the functional reason for validity, the determi-
nation of a norm-creating authority stressing the "how" of norm
creation. By stressing impartial functionalism, the Pure Theory thus
disengages from obtrusions that unduly alloy, legal analysis, and
prevents construction of a valid and viable legal science.
So process, or if you will in the larger sense procedure, reigns. A
presupposed ultimate norm wherefrom others flow controls the grad-
ation as a kind of prototype first cause, but still with content funda-
mentally excluded. Imparting the logical unity to the multiplicity of
norms necessary to constitute the legal order, the basic norm stipulates
effectiveness as the key condition of validity. Crucially, though, the
differing levels must be distinguished, and the relationship may
range from partially choate to semi-inchoate, thus allowing inter-
national law for all its grievous deficiencies to subsist as a cognitive
legal order. Again in the dynamic aspect the detachment of neutrality
vis-a-vis internal law applies, in that the basic norm does not perform
an "ethical-political but only an epistemological function." Law, for
all its potency and power, can only be considered legally.
Consonantly, the Pure Theory approach moves to close the tradi-
tional diarchies of theory, especially those concerning the state. Con-
trasts between private and public law are "relativized" by positivism,
thereby making them an intra-systematic rather than an extra-
systematic differentiation and thereby also dissolving the "absolutizing"
ideological heterodoxy implying that public law is somhow foreign to
private legality and placing legal power of the state in a class by it-
self. Even more strenuously this concept of whole pattern nullifies the
diarchy of law and state, for the state should be considered as the
most total of legal orders and the idea of a "community generated by
law must become the only possible justification of the state." To assert
otherwise does not endeavor to reach the essence of the state, but
rather to insidiously strengthen state authority. State power has "nor-
mative character," and instead of concealing some peculiar mystique
of force only embodies the penetrating and forming pinnacle of the
overall effectiveness of the national legal order. This approach allows
maintenance of the doctrine that the state can do no wrong, at least
in the necessity of ultimate type obligative decisions, but does not re-
ject-indeed rather encourages-compensatory concrete actions to re-
[Vol. 57,
Boox Bxvmws
dress errors of state as well as accessiblity of rejoinder against action
beyond color of authority.
In a word, power should have the aura of respect, never the corona
of sanctity. Final authority must prevail, but not in a realm of its own.
In more traditional theoretical terms the state has the self-obligation
"while it exists as a social reality independent of law" that "creates the
law" to subject itself to the law, "voluntarily as it were."5 By the
linkage of man-created norms composing the law and formulated in its
process there opens the way for a true science of law, a science in-
clusive of the international sphere.
Dr. Kelsen, whose work in this area reflects the deserved eminence
of decades, projects the Pure Theory to a logically consistent but de-
batable proposition-that international law qualiffies as a viable legal
order integrated with the whole texture of legal systems. Admittedly
a primitive legal order in a state of "far-reaching decentralization,"
the international system possesses its sanctions-reprisal and war-
and indirectly its coercive mandate through massive although filtered
applications to human behavior through its traditional practice of
having only states as its subjects. This reasoning allows legal cogni-
zance of the absolute, collective liability of citizens and the individual
culpability of officials for illicit acts of state, an approach harmonious
with the Pure Theory's insulation of law from morals yet shying away
from the searing dilemmas these very issues place on the twentieth
century soul. It may well be that legal systems need pasteurized
neutrality, but legal refinement in the interests of any legal objective
cannot legitimately purify the law to the point of being oblivious to
principle.
This refinement, however, does permit a tapestry of theoretical
unification of the international and national legal orders. Again dualism
is untenable, for the two do not depend upon two alien though kindred
norms and no conflict exists. The two are monistically joined, whether
primacy belongs to the national or to the international order, for a
state either incorporates the international into its internal order by
reception or the international itself assumes a sovereignty validating
a multitude of partial legal orders within a "universal world legal
order." Theoretically the conclusion abides, the "cognitive unity of all
valid law," even though the world community remains far more of a
dream than an aspiration and some orders like Red China behave in a
5 Id. at 312.
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fashion that even the Pure Theory would be hard put to call any-
thing but outlawry.
This book must be credited with a valiant effort at condensation,
for it endeavors to present a singular, coherent formulation within a
comparatively limited space. In so doing the work squarely meets and
treats most of the basic subjects known to civilized law, and does
so with logical competency and reasonable consistency to explain these
subjects in terms of the overall theoretical framework. So consistently,
as a matter of fact, that the great care taken with construction often
tends to bog down into undue repetition. The work cannot be seriously
criticized, however, on any major score except perhaps one. Whenever
the Pure Theory approaches the area of the active, especially the
political, the analysis veers away. To be sure it forswears these con-
siderations, calling their disposition impossible of decision on the
basis of its version of legal science inasmuch as they are solely de-
pendent on "nonscientific, political considerations." Internally this may
be perfectly defensible, but the query abides. As a matter of both
principle and practicality, can law ever validly reject such matters
completely? In a word, can values ever be truly denatured from de-
terminative human behavior?
Be that as it may, background considerations do not injure the
presentation, as can be the case so often and so easily with works of
this type and this ambition. Max Knight's skillful translation comes
through with arresting clarity for a work in German philosophical
thought, that is if Teutonic abstraction can ever achieve such a status
in English. The Roman law context of reference is rather constant,
but handled fairly and rather deftly by the author, whose illustrative
cases in point are rather suprisingly simple by comparison with the
theoretical construct, and whose contrasting references to the Anglo-
American system fully demonstrate his long and deep experience with
both jurisprudential systems. The technique and the insight are fully
in keeping with the tremendous scope and depth, and in most respects
the excellence, of the effort.
This work in no way can be called light reading, even for those
seasoned in legal subjects. The treatment is contracted almost to the
point of total compression, endeavoring as it does to present an entire
system of legal philosophy within, for a law book especially, one
slender volume. Thus Kelsen's Pure Theory will probably best serve as
a reference work, or as a source of juridical stimulation, far better than
it can serve any explanatory or instructional role. And while perhaps
no mother lode, if legally such a thing can even be conceived, it holds
[Vol. 57,
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rich lore of original, creative thought in both substance and method.
This plenary undertaking qualifies as whole thought, an uncommon
approach that in itself, in this creatively churning age that tends to look
somewhat askance at integration, goes far toward assuring its per-
manent significance.
Charles W. Van Cleve
Assistant Professor of Government
University of Texas at Arlington
